Latin American Inequality over Five Centuries
Most analysts of the modern Latin American economy carry a pessimistic belief in historical persistence: that is, they believe that Latin America has always had very high levels of income and wealth inequality, suggesting it will be hard, or even impossible, for modern social policy to create a more egalitarian society. This paper argues that this conclusion is not supported by what little evidence we have. The persistence view is based on an historical literature which has made little or no effort to be comparative.
Indeed, other studies have shown that even where there is measured historical persistence, the effects decay over time (Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Nunn 2008; Bruhn and Gallego 2009 ). Yet modern analysts see a more unequal Latin America compared with Asia and the rich post-industrial nations (López and Perry 2008) and then assume that this must always have been true. Indeed, some have argued that high inequality appeared very early in the post-conquest Americas, and that this fact supported rent-seeking and anti-growth institutions which help explain the disappointing growth performance we observe there even today. This paper argues to the contrary. Compared with the rest of the world, inequality was not high in pre-conquest 1491, nor was it high in the postconquest decades following 1492. Indeed, it was not even high in the mid-19 th century just prior Latin America's belle époque. It only became high thereafter. Historical persistence in Latin American inequality is a myth.
The next section places Latin American pre-industrial inequality in context by comparing it with inequality the world around over the two millennia from Rome in 14
AD to British India in 1947. It turns out that there is little that is unusual about pre-industrial Latin America when that comparison is made. The paper then offers empirical explanations for pre-industrial inequality the world around over the two millennia since Rome, including late 18 th and 19 th century Latin America. Next, we ask whether Latin America has always been more unequal. The paper goes on to use the estimated relationship found in the pre-industrial sample to fill by prediction the many and big empirical gaps in Latin American inequality history from 1491 through the end of the belle époque. That is, it uses an estimated world pre-industrial relationship to predict
Latin American inequality where no income distribution evidence is yet available. These predictions are then compared with the Latin American inequality facts where they exist.
The paper concludes by posing four revisionist hypotheses. The hope is that these working hypotheses will be used to motivate the collection of new pre-industrial inequality evidence and thus perhaps to overthrow once and for all the historical persistence view that pervades modern debate about Latin American inequality. Social tables are particularly useful in evaluating ancient societies where classes were clearly delineated, where the differences in mean incomes between them were substantial, and where mobility between them was trivial. If class (and race) alone determined one's income, and if income differences between classes were large while income differences within classes were small (mainly reflecting life-cycle status and luck), then most inequality would be explained by average income differences between classes. One of the most famous social tables was constructed by Gregory King for England and Wales in 1688 (Barnett 1936; Lindert and Williamson 1982 ). King's class list was fairly detailed (31 in number), but he did not report inequalities within these social groups, so we cannot identify within-class inequality for 1688 England. Yet, when income variance within class is also available for any pre-industrial country offering social table estimates, the differences between measured inequality are typically very small whether within class variance is included or excluded. Indeed, when comparing any two pre-industrial societies where full size distributions are available, inequality differences between them can be explained almost entirely by inequality differences measured by class differences alone. In short, the lion's share of inequality in pre-industrial societies is and was accounted for by between-class average income differences. Table 1 and Figure 1 report what these BMW data look like. The Gini estimates are plotted in Figure 1 against income or GDP (or GDI) per capita. Figure 1 also displays what we call the inequality possibility frontier (solid line), a curve based on the maximum inequality the elite could have extracted at that income per capita. The maximum is constructed under the assumption that everybody but the elite in such repressive societies would have gotten just the World Bank's subsistence minimum of $PPP 300.
Latin America in
2 The ratio of the actual inequality to the maximum feasible inequality (both expressed in Gini coefficients) is called the extraction ratio. 3 In most cases, the calculated pre-industrial Ginis lie pretty close to the inequality possibility frontier (IPF).
The countries farthest below the IPF curve -with the lowest extraction ratios --are the most advanced pre-industrial economies in northwestern Europe: that is, 1561-1808
Holland, 1788 France, and 1688-1801 England.
The inequality possibility frontier allows us to better situate these ancient preindustrial inequality estimates in a modern context. The bottom panel of Table 1 provides estimates of inequality extraction ratios for 25 contemporary societies. Brazil has often 2 This is less than Maddison's (1998: 12) assumed subsistence minimum of $PPP 400 which, in principle, covers more than physiological needs. Note that a purely physiological minimum "sufficient to sustain life with moderate activity and zero consumption of other goods" (Bairoch 1993: 106) was estimated by Bairoch to be $PPP 80 at 1960 prices, or $PPP 355 at 1990 prices. Our minimum is also consistent with the World Bank absolute poverty line which is 1.08 per day per capita in 1993 $PPP (Chen and Ravallion 2007: 6) . This works out to be about $PPP 365 per annum in 1990 international prices. Since more than a billion people are believed to have incomes less than the World Bank global poverty line, it seems reasonable to assume that the physiological minimum income must be less. One may recall also that Colin Clark (1957: 18-23 ) distinguished between international units (the early PPP dollar) and oriental units, the lower dollar equivalents which he thought held for subtropical or tropical regions where calorie, housing and clothing needs are considerably less than those in temperate climates. Since our ancient pre-industrial sample includes a fair number of tropical countries, this gives us another reason to use a conservatively low estimate of the physiological minimum. 3 The extraction ratio is not unlike an index of the percent in poverty, but where the poverty line is fixed.
been cited as an example of an extremely unequal society, driven by a long history of slavery, racial discrimination and regional dualism. Indeed, Brazil's Gini in 2002 is comparable to the most unequal pre-industrial societies in our ancient inequality sample.
But Brazil is more than four times richer than the average ancient society in our sample, so its maximum feasible inequality (92.7) is much higher than our ancient society average (60.6). As a country becomes richer, and its surplus above subsistence rises, its feasible inequality expands. Consequently, even if recorded inequality is stable, the extraction ratio must fall. This can be seen in Figure 2 where the inequality extraction ratio is plotted against income per capita for both ancient societies and their modern counterparts. Thus, the social consequences of increased inequality may not entail as much relative impoverishment, or as much perceived injustice, as might appear if we looked only at the recorded Gini. This logic is particularly compelling for low and middle-income societies where increases in income push the maximum feasible inequality up sharply along the steepest part of the IPF curve. The farther a society rises above the subsistence minimum, the less will economic development lift its inequality possibilities, and thus the extraction ratio will be driven more and more by the rise in the actual Gini itself. Thus, the inequality extraction ratio has fallen everywhere in Latin 56.7 in 2002) . While the rest of this paper will focus on actual or measured inequality, future debates over social justice and economic development will have to struggle with the implications of different trends in actual inequality and extraction ratios.
Fundamentals: Explaining Pre-Industrial Inequality the World Round
Using this BMW information from ancient pre-industrial societies, can we explain differences in observed inequality? The Kuznets hypothesis posits that inequality tends to follow a bell-shape as average real income increases. Although Kuznets formulated his hypothesis explicitly with a view toward industrializing and industrialized economies, one might wonder whether his Curve is even more apparent among our pre-industrial economies as well. After all, the secular upswing could be easily explained by increases in per capita income: poor countries do not have much surplus for the elite to extract, but as income rises in pre-industrial economies, so does the surplus and potential inequality.
In addition to log average income and its square, Table 2 includes the urbanization rate, population density and colonial status (a dummy variable). The regression also includes a number of controls for country-specific eccentricities in the data: the number of social groups available for calculating the Gini, whether the social table is based on tax data, and whether the social table for a colony includes the income of resident colonists. The
Kuznets hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient on average income (or its log) and negative coefficient on its square. We also expect higher inequality for the more urbanized countries (reflecting a common finding that inequality in urban areas tends to be higher than in rural areas: Ravallion et al. 2007) , and for those that are ruled by foreign elites since powerful colonizers are presumed to be able to achieve higher extraction rates than weaker local elites, and since countries with weak local elites but with large surpluses will attract powerful colonizers to extract it Robinson 2001, 2002) .
The empirical results confirm all expectations. Both income terms are of the right sign and significant, supporting a pre-industrial Kuznets Curve. 4 The sign on the urbanization rate is, as predicted, positive, but since it competes with population density, its statistical significance is somewhat lower. Still, each percentage point increase in the urbanization rate (say, from 10 percent to 11 percent) is associated with an increase in the Gini by 0.35 points. Colonies were clearly much more unequal: holding everything else constant, colonies had a Gini almost 13 points higher than non-colonies. 5 Foreigner is a dummy variable that controls for two observations (South Serbia 1455 and Levant 1596) that were colonies but where their ancient inequality surveys did not report the incomes and numbers of colonizers at the top. This is therefore simply another control for data eccentricity, and its negative sign shows that being a colony, but not having colonizers included in the survey, reduces recorded inequality considerably (9 to 10 points).
The number of social groups used in the inequality calculations, or tax census origin of social tables, do not affect the Gini in any significant way. This finding is comforting, especially regarding Nueva España's three classes, because it shows that our estimates of inequality are being driven by fundamentals, not by the way the social tables were constructed by pre-industrial observers.
Population density is negatively associated with inequality, although its significance weakens when the two Java observations -the most dense part of the preindustrial world -are removed. It might have been expected that the introduction of a dummy variable for more densely populated Asia would have caused the effect of density to dissipate. This is not the case, as shown in column 2 of Table 2 . The negative impact of population density on inequality seems to be counter-intuitive. After all, conventional theory -which we will exploit below --would predict that more population pressure on the land should raise land yields and rents, lower labor's marginal product and the wage, thus producing more inequality, not less. Furthermore, this effect should have been all the more powerful in pre-industrial societies where land and labor drove inequality not, as in modern societies, human capital and financial wealth. It seems likely that this conventional effect is being offset in the ancient economy data by two forces. First, densely populated agrarian societies also had lower per capita income, so this may have been working against the conventional force (since inequality rises with per capita income). Second, more densely populated agrarian societies must have had higher relative food prices than thinly settled societies, so that nominal subsistence had to be much higher to purchase the more expensive foodstuffs, lowering measured inequality and the extraction ratio. 6 It seems likely that this force must have been most powerful during the two millennia before the middle of the 19 th century since a world market for grains did not yet exist and thus local conditions dictated the relative price of food (Latham and Neal 1983; Clingingsmith and Williamson 2008; Studer 2008) . This second offset has important implications for comparing inequality in the labor-scarce and resource-abundant Americas with the labor-abundant and resource-scarce Europe, and between the densely populated highlands in Mexico and the Andes relative to resourceabundant Southern Cone. However, it is less clear that it had the same effect within countries over time, since the results in Table 2 rely almost entirely on a cross section, not a time series. Finally, to the extent that population size and density are correlated, there is a third possible offset. Looking at modern data, Filipe Campante and Quoc-Anh Do (2007) explain the negative correlation by the size of the potential revolutionary underclass concentrated around the capital thus posing a threat to the elite.
The stylized picture that emerges is this: Inequality follows contours that are consistent with the Kuznets Curve hypothesis, a pre-industrial secular rise to a peak, followed by a fall during modern economic growth. It follows that most of the pre- where the local elite had relaxed their extraction rate. We will return to this issue below.
Has Latin America Always Been More Unequal?
Has Latin America always been more unequal than other parts of the world, as Figure 3 use the Gini regression equation (1) in Table 2 and estimates of the dependent variables also reported in Table 4 to predict Ginis for Latin America in 1491 before the arrival of the Iberians, shortly after the conquest (call it 1492), 1600, 1700, 1790, 1820 and 1870. Table 4 implies that the Gini coefficient in Latin America prior to the arrival of the Iberians was 22.5, which would have made it the society with the lowest inequality in the pre-industrial world (or at least in our sample of it: Table 1 ). China in 1880 had a Gini of 24.5, very close to pre-conquest Latin America. Dutch colonial Java had a Gini in 1880 of 39.7, a figure which would have been 27.1 without the Dutch colonists (according to the BMW regression, 39.7-12.6 = 27.1). Thus, Table 4 implies that preconquest Latin America had modest levels of inequality much like all the other poor preindustrial societies in our sample which had escaped being colonized.
Extracting the Surplus: What Was the Colonial Impact Like after 1492?
Given what we know about ancient pre-industrial economies the world around, and assuming that Iberian colonists were no better or worse at extracting surplus than were the other colonizers in the ancient inequality sample (England, Holland, and the Ottoman Turks), the answer to this question is quite simple. Colonies had higher Gini coefficients by 12-13 percentage points ( It is useful to elaborate that last point: the demographic disaster in Latin America must have contributed to higher (but unknown) GDP per capita and average labor productivity, higher marginal productivity of labor, and lower marginal productivity of land, suggesting that the wage-rental ratio (w/r) went up and that inequality went down.
The economics can be made a little more precise. Assume that only land (R) and labor (L) mattered in the early colonial economy, and that technology (A) was unchanged across the 16 th century. If we also assume constant returns to scale, then it follows that
The marginal product of labor and land are, respectively,
so that the wage-rental ratio is
Thus, the wage-rental ratio rises with the land-labor ratio, and the elasticity relating the two is (under these assumptions) always 1.
11 Bates, Coatsworth and Williamson (2007: 919-20) . Note the demographic parallel with Alwyn Young's argument that today's HIV-AIDS raises the incomes of those Africans who survive the disease (Young 2005) , or Joel Mokyr's argument that the Irish famine in the late 1840s raised per capita income of the survivors (Mokyr 1983 ).
The elasticity of GDP per capita to the land-labor ratio is α. Coatsworth (2008: 548) thinks the fall was even bigger: "Mexican production stagnated for most of the seventeenth century, falling by half in per capita terms as population recovered … The revival of the indigenous population … put an end to rising productivity in agriculture." Of course, things were different in the sugar-based plantation islands of the Caribbean, but these crude estimates generated by land-labor ratio trends are used in Table 4 to interpolate GDP per capita between Maddison's observations for 1500 and 1790.
According to the simple economics above, the percentage rise in the wage-rental ratio across the 16 th century would have been about the same as the percentage fall in the labor-land ratio. 12 If population fell by Livi-Bacci's 90 percent estimate (from an index of 100 to 10), then the land-labor ratio rose by a factor of ten (from an index of 10 to 100), 13 which implies that wage-rental ratio rose by a factor of 10 as well. As we noted above, and based instead on Maddison's population estimates, Table 4 implies that the landlabor ratio rose by more than 100 percent. We have assumed perfect competition in these calculations which, of course, is completely inconsistent with our knowledge that Iberian colonists introduced coercive and repressive devices so that labor's greater scarcity was not fully rewarded. In more formal terms, the Iberians used slavery, haciendas and other institutions to push the wage below labor's marginal product (Coatsworth 2008; Bértola et al. 2009: 6-8) . Thus, the demographically-induced rise in the wage-rental ratio must have been considerably less than 100 percent. But even if it was only 25 or 50 percent, it implies pronounced downward pressure on inequality across the 16 th century.
Furthermore, it seems likely that land concentration also diminished as labor got scarcer, so there are other reasons to believe that exogenous demographic trends put strong downward pressure on inequality across the 16 th century. On the other hand, improved productivity in extracting minerals from the mines as well as any general improvement in economy-wide productivity (e.g. a rise in A) might have pushed inequality in the opposite direction, upwards. What was the net effect? Table 4 predicts that after the initial effect of colonization, there was very little additional change in Latin American inequality up to 1600.
technological transfer from Europe and mining development must have increased A in the formal output and output per worker expression in the text. This point is expanded below. 13 The cultivatable land area of Latin America was 10.966 million km 2 between 1500 and 1800. LiviBacci's 50 million pre-conquest population implies a population density of 4.56. His 3-4 (say 3.5) million estimate for c1700 implies a density of 0.31, a spectacular fall of population density over the 16 th century.
Inequality Rise: What Did Latin American Inequality Look Like in 1790?
Over the two centuries between 1600 and 1790, a number of fundamentals were at work in Latin America which would have served to raise inequality and extraction ratios.
First and foremost, populations partially recovered their 16 th century losses. Interpolating 1790 from Maddison's (2008) estimates for 1700 and 1820, yields a rise in population from 8.6 million in 1600 to 12.45 million in 1790. Thus, population density rose from about 0.78 to 1.14, and land-labor ratios fell by about 31 percent. Second, GDP per capita rose from 438 to 650, or almost by half, and urbanization rose from 9 to 14.2 percent, or by more than half. These forces imply that the Gini might have risen from 36.2 to 57.6, which, according to the Table 4 predictions, implies that over the three centuries between 1491 and 1870 Latin American inequality reached its peak in the late colonial decades just prior to independence.
Revolution, Independence and Lost Decades
While revolution, independence and the 'lost decades' that followed up to about 1870 (Bates, Coatsworth and Williamson 2007) were very complicated times, and while there must have been many forces at work influencing inequality, the ancient inequality regression predicts that the Gini probably dropped from 57.6 in 1790 to 46. Figure 1 ) confirms this prediction of falling inequality after independence. She uses data on wage rates and land rents to infer trends in inequality. When her rent-wage ratios for Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela are weighted by 1850 populations, the resulting Latin American rent-wage ratio falls by 11 percent 1820-1850, and for Mexico alone the fall is 12 percent.
Furthermore, the Arroyo Abad Mexican rent-wage ratio trends and the Mexican Gini coefficients coming from the social tables in Table 4 are closely reproduced by the Amilcar Challu rent-wage series for central Mexico 1780-1869 reported in Table 5 .
Challu's inequality index rises by 38 percent from the 1780s to the 1800s, falls by 29 percent from the 1800s to the 1820s, and then continues a slow downward drift during the 'lost decades' up to the 1860s. To summarize, the Arroyo Abad index falls by 4 percent per decade between 1820 and 1850, the Challu index falls by 5.2 percent per decade between 1820 and 1869, and our Gini in Table 4 falls by almost 2 percent per decade between 1820 and 1870.
1.4): between 1820 and 1850, the two biggest republics, Brazil and Mexico, grew at 0 and 0.1 percent per annum, respectively; in the 1850s, the figures were -0.1 and -1.3. Lost decades indeed. 15 In personal correspondence, Challu has described Querétaro as quite representative, but it is, of course, only one state. The economics underlying Coatsworth's statement above is, of course, quite straight forward. Latin America faced a rising terms of trade throughout the late 19 th century. Since it was a primary product exporter, land and mineral rents were driven up relative to wages. This happened everywhere around the poor periphery (Williamson 2002 (Williamson , 2008 , but it was especially dramatic in Latin America partly because the region was able to expand its export sectors so effectively, thus to become very large shares in GDP (Williamson 2009 : Table 4 .1). Since land and mineral resources were held by those at the top, inequality rose as well. Not too long ago, the only data we had to judge the magnitude of these inequality trends were proxies, like the land rent to unskilled wage ratio or the GDP per worker to unskilled wage ratio (Williamson 1999 (Williamson , 2002 . Thus, when the rent-wage ratios for Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela (Arroyo Abad 2008: Figure 1 ) are weighted by 1890 populations, the Latin American average rises 7.9 percent per decade 1850-1870 and 6.3 percent per decade 1870-1900, for a total increase of 37 percent after 1850. This rent-wage proxy thus implies a big inequality surge over the second half of the century. We also have the more comprehensive belle époque inequality evidence for the Southern Cone summarized in Table 12 .1) calls his backward projected Pseudo-Ginis. They both tell the same tale:
Creating Modern Inequality during the
inequality rose by 11-37 percent over the belle époque. True, and as the table makes clear, the Latin American weighted average reported in Table 6 Table 4 would imply that it rose from 46.4 to 60.3, making the Gini in the 1920s the highest that
Latin America recorded since pre-conquest, even higher than the 1790 colonial peak (57.6), and much, much higher than 1600 (36.2). Any modern analyst who believes that high inequality has been an attribute of Latin America since the Iberian conquest should take note.
Revisionist Hypotheses
Figure 3 plots our inequality predictions from 1491 to 1929. However crude the evidence may seem, it points to several revisionist interpretations of, or hypotheses about, 500 years of Latin American inequality. than it was for all pre-industrial societies for which we can get the data (Gini 44.3: Table   1 ). To repeat, while inequality was high in Latin America as it was poised for its industrial revolution, it was no higher than the average pre-industrial society, nor higher than industrializing Europe.
Fourth, globalization forces during the belle époque pushed Latin American inequality up to historic highs by the 1920s. Although that belle époque inequality boom cannot yet be adequately measured for all of Latin America, it looks like ongoing research will shortly do so (e.g Bértola et al. 2009 ). Other primary product exporters underwent similar inequality-enhancing booms over that half century too (Williamson 2002; , but it appears that Latin America had one of the biggest inequality booms, and, even more notable, that the high inequality achieved persisted (and even increased) during the anti-global episode between the 1920s and the 1970s (Prados 2007: Table   12 .1). The latter offers a striking contrast with the industrialized world which underwent a great egalitarian leveling across the mid-20 th century (Williamson and Lindert 1980: 53-62; Goldin and Margo 1992; Atkinson and Piketty 2008 
